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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is appropi uie in tins case pursuant to UCA §78-2-2 and UCA §78-2a-
3(2)0). 
NT \ TEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the trial court used an incorrect legal standard to determine duties 
and damages under the party's contract. 
Standard of review: 
The is an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant Lourt 
accords the Trial Cour • l^ pnl conclusions no deference and *vvh^\ K t h , ^ 'V 
corrective 
Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, hu . 9^3 P 2d 575 fill all 1999). 
II \ Whether the evidence support* . 
• contract with the Plaintiff. 
Determinative law: 
Child v. Gondii. V 2 » . u * . ^ - . . -^S) 
rjcupu. i h I - -; • • •••' /' ' .* «<><• 1 4 S V \\ I 1 S"< ( t ) t a h A p p . 2 0 0 6 ) . 
Hansen v. Sfcwart, ~(* i P 2d I i ^ Jtah 1988) 
Standard of review: 
An Appellate ( Vmrt will not overturn a trial court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous. 
Harris v. IESAssociates, 69 V3i\yy>-[\ tali \pp "ur >^. 
II III III Whether the evic < - breached its conti act 
with BushnelL 
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Determinative law: 
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 (Utah 1998) 
Eleopulos v. McFarland and Hollinger, LLC, 145 P.3d 1157 (Utah App. 2006). 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988) 
Standard of review: 
An Appellate Court will not overturn a trial court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous. 
IV. Whether the trial court erred in awarding judgment to Bushnell on claims 
that had previously been dismissed. 
Determinative law: 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
State in Interest ofL. G. W, 638 P.2d 527 (Utah 1981) 
Standard of review: 
This is purely an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant Court 
accords the Trial Courts legal conclusions no deference and reviews them for 
correctness. 
Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc., 983 P 2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
V. Whether the trial Court erred in awarding Defendants all of their requested 
attorney fees. 
Determinative law: 
Utah Code Ann. 78-27-56.5 
Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52 (Utah 1998). 
Jensen v. Sawyer, 130 P.3d 325 (Utah 2005). 
Kurth v. Wiarda, 991 P.2d 1113 (Utah App. 1999). 
Mountain States Broad Co. vs. Neele, 783 P. 2d 551, 556 (Utah App. 1989) 
Paul De Groot Bldg. Servs., L,L. C v. Gallacher, 112 P.3d 490 (Utah 2005). 
Pochynok Company, Inc. v. Smedsrud, 116 P.3d 353 (Utah 2005). 
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Standard of review: 
When reviewing attorney fee decisions that involve questions of law the Appellate 
Court reviews for correctness. 
Pochynok Company, Inc. v. Smedsrud, 116 P.3d 353, 355 (Utah 2005). 
VI. Whether the trial Court erred in awarding Defendants costs in excess of those 
allowed by law. 
Determinative Law: 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). 
Eleopulos vs. McFarland and Hollinger, LLC, 145 P 3d 1157, 1159 (Utah App. 
2006). 
Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah2d2Sl, 358 ?2d 89(Utah 1961) 
Stevens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1988) 
Armed Forces Ins. Exch. V. Harrison, 70 P.3d 35 (Utah 2003). 
Standard of review: 
This is purely an issue of law. When reviewing an issue of law the Appellant 
Court accords the Trial Court's legal conclusions no deference and reviews them 
for correctness. 
Nova Casualty Company v. Able Construction, Inc., 983 P 2d 575 (Utah 1999). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND 
RULES 
Copies of all determinative constitution provisions, statutes, and rules are attached 
hereto as Addendum "B". 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was initiated by the Plaintiff with the filing of a Complaint on or about 
June 12, 2006 R. 1. The Defendants answered and Defendant Bushnell filed cross-claims 
and a third party complaint against Dale K. Barker Jr. R.39. After an extended period of 
discovery, the matter came before the court for a bench trial which took place on March 
31 through April 3, 2008. R. 434-437. 
At the close of the Defendants case in chief, the Court dismissed the Third Party 
Complaint and all but one issue of Bushnell's counterclaim. R.437, Pg. 646, 701-
702,705. At the close of trial the court took the matter under advisement. R. 437 Pg. 773. 
On April 21, 2008, the Court called the parties back to court for its ruling. At that 
time the court ruled that Plaintiff failed to prevail on its claims against the Defendants. 
R. 452. It also ruled that Bushnell was successful on his breach of contract counterclaim, 
but that as he had failed to prove any damages, the court was awarding only nominal 
damages. R. 452. 
After the Court entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, 
Plaintiff filed a timely motion under Rule 59. R.479. After argument that motion was 
denied and this appeal was subsequently taken.R.602. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Defendant John Bushnell is a tax cheat. He didn't file tax returns for the years 
1995 through 2003. R. 460. When he was caught by the IRS, he prepared returns for 
1995 and 1996 and submitted them to the IRS. In the spring of 2005 he came to the 
4 
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Company and asked it to review the returns he had prepared for 1995 and 1996 and to 
prepare tax returns for himself and his corporation Bushnet, Inc. through 2004. R.460. 
The Company agreed to perform the work as requested. R.461. Subsequently Bushnell 
also requested the Company negotiate with the IRS on his behalf. R.461. For the services 
performed on behalf of Bushnell, the Company billed $19,000.00. Plaintiffs Exhibit #4. 
Bushnell paid $2,180.00 of those bills. For the services performed on behalf of Bushnet 
the Plaintiff billed $45,355.20. Plaintiffs Exhibit #5. Of this amount, $12,680.20 was 
reimbursement for taxes paid on Bushnell's behalf to the IRS. The amount for services 
rendered was actually $32,675.00 of which Bushnet paid $17,639.80. Plaintiffs Exhibit 
#5. Bushnell signed documents accepting the amount of the billings and the work that 
had been performed. Plaintiffs Exhibits 66-74. Bushnell made a series of promises that 
he would pay the amounts owing. Plaintiffs Exhibit #7. In spite of these acceptances and 
promises, Bushnell failed to pay the balances owing. Finally, the Company brought suit 
to collect the balances. R.l. Bushnell countered by filing a counterclaim and third party 
complaint. 
The matter eventually came on for trial. At the close of BushnelPs case, the 
Plaintiff made a motion to dismiss the counterclaim and third party complaint. The Court 
granted the motion with respect to the third party complaint and with respect to all of the 
counterclaim for negligence, but ruled that the counterclaim for breach of contract 
survived with respect only to the claim that the compilation performed on behalf of the 
clients was unnecessary. 
5 
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At the close of trial, the court held that there was insufficient evidence to show 
either of the Defendant's owed more to the Company than they had already paid. If 
further held that the compilation was unnecessary because the Defendants records were 
adequate. Finally, it held that other issues, which it had ruled dismissed pursuant to the 
Rule 50 motion constituted additional breaches of the contract between Bushnell and the 
Plaintiff and accordingly awarded Bushnell nominal damages of $10.00. Based on that 
finding the Court determined Bushnell to be the prevailing party and awarded him costs 
and fees in excess of $100,000.00 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs initial concerns are matters of law. With respect to the Company's 
breach of contract claim the trial court improperly created a standard requiring the 
Company to prove the reasonableness and necessity of the services it provided and the 
fees charged therefore. The court in this role impermissibly put itself in the position of 
rewriting the agreement between the parties. Had the court simply enforced the plain 
agreement as understood by the parties, Plaintiff would have been awarded all of its 
unpaid bills. 
The next error occurred where the court, using the improper standard, failed to 
recognize the evidence that had been presented. Possibly, because of the eighteen day 
delay between the close of trial and the court's ruling, the court found it had been 
presented no evidence as to the reasonable amount chargeable for the services performed 
by the Company. This finding was directly contrary to the evidence presented and to the 
6 
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Court's own ruling denying the Defendant's request for a directed verdict. 
The Court next erred in finding a breach of the contract by the Company. First, 
the court incorrectly found that the provision of additional work in some fashion created a 
breach of the contract. There is no support for that in the language of the contract or in 
the law. Next, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the work performed was reasonable 
and necessary. Finally, the Court improperly found additional alleged breaches of the 
contract between the parties on issues which it had already dismissed pursuant to the 
directed verdict motion of the Company. Because the court had dismissed these items, no 
contrary evidence was presented concerning them. To subsequently rule on these issues 
after lulling the Company into not addressing them violates the Company's due process 
rights. 
Finally, the trial court improperly awarded the Defendants over $100,000.00 in 
fees and costs. A detailed examination shows these claimed items contain thousands of 
dollars of nontaxable costs and fees, even if we accept that the $10.00 nominal damage 
award justifies the award of any fees or taxable costs. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
This case involved three separate actions which were consolidated for purposes of 
judicial economy. Unfortunately, this consolidation appears to have led to confusion by 
the trial court of the issues and facts presented. The first action is a claim by Dale K. 
Barker Co. P.C.( the "Company") against John K. Bushnell ("Bushnell") for tax work 
7 
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performed for him personally. This action would also encompass the Counterclaim filed 
by Bushnell against the Company. The second action was a claim by Dale K. Barker Co. 
P.C. against Bushnet, Inc. ("Bushnet") for unpaid tax work performed on its behalf. 
Bushnet did not file any counterclaims. These two actions are the subject matter of this 
appeal. 
The final action was a Third Party Complaint filed by Bushnell against Dale K. 
Barker Jr. This action is the subject matter of a separate appeal, and consequently the 
issues surrounding it will not be addressed here. 
In order to avoid the apparent confusion caused at the trial court, this appeal will 
separately address the issues of the two causes of action that are the subject matter of this 
appeal. 
I. DALE K. BARKER CO. P.C. vs. JOHN K. BUSHNELL 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
THAT BUSHNELL DID NOT BREACH HIS CONTRACT WITH THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
1. Marshalling Of the Evidence. 
a. Required standards. 
If an appeal is made of a trial court's denial of a motion under Rule 59, the 
standard of review requires the appellate court to view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the party who prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988). In 
order to make the latter determination, there must be a marshaling of the evidence in 
order for the appellate court to undertake a proper review. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425 
8 
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(Utah 1998). In response to the Company's Rule 59 memorandum, Bushnell put together 
what he declared was a "marshalling of the evidence". R. 553-R.573. That 
"marshalling", is attached hereto as Addendum "C". 
b. Evidence supporting the trial court's holding. 
Under our Utah court decisions, the Appellant's burden is not simply to state the 
facts, but to argue them in the Appellees favor and then to show that even with this 
"marshalling" the trial court's ruling was in error. 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 4, admitted at trial, sets forth a total amount incurred by 
Bushnell for the work performed on his behalf of $19,000.00 with total payments of 
$2,180.00. This left a balance owing of $16,820.00. The Statements and bills for 
Bushnet, P.C. were contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit #5. The Statement shows total 
invoices of $45,355.20 and corresponding payments of $30,320.00. This is a little 
misleading however as $12,680.20 was simply reimbursement for the taxes owed by 
Bushnell paid by Dale K. Barker Co. P.C. on behalf of Mr. Bushnell. The actual fees for 
services were therefore $32,675.00 and actual payments against that amount were 
$17,639.80. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, prepared by Bushnell, the court 
did not make a separate finding with respect to the amount billed to Bushnell or the 
amount he paid. Instead, the findings of fact merge the amounts relating to Bushnell and 
Bushnet. 
9 
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Finding of Fact #35 states: "At the time Mr. Bushnell terminated his relationship 
with Barker, Barker had billed Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet a total of $64,300.21." R. 464. 
Finding of Fact #37 states: "Mr. Bushnell paid $32,500.00 to Barker." Adding the 
two sums set forth in Exhibits 4 and 5 shows a total billing of $64,355.20 and total 
payments including reimbursement of the funds to the IRS of $32,500.00. The findings 
of fact accordingly support the amounts claimed to have been billed and paid by the 
Company.1 
The contract between the Company and Bushnell was admitted into evidence as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit # 2. The stated scope of the work was set forth in paragraph 1. It 
states: 
1. Scope of Services. Barker agrees to perform the following services for Client, 
including such additional sendees related thereto which are reasonably required. 
(a.) All requested services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker 
either express, written, or/and implied. Also, the acceptance of all prior services 
and billings rendered by Barker. 
The trial court found that the scope of services included the preparation of the past 
due tax returns, preparation of the currently due tax returns and negotiations with the IRS. 
Finding of Fact #8 (R.461) Conclusion of Law 43 (R.466). 
The contract also established what the Company was to be paid for the services it 
was performing. Paragraph 2 of the contract states, in pertinent part: 
1
 In BushnelPs "marshalling", he cites only to Plaintiffs Exhibits 4 and 5 and to a statement by Bushnell that he 
paid approximately $32,000.00. 
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2. Fees. 
(a.)Rate. As compensation for all services (including Telephone Conferences) 
rendered by Barker pursuant to this agreement, Client shall pay to Barker on the 
terms and conditions contained herein; fees on a project by project basis... 
1 .Payment of Fees. 
(a.)Time. Barker shall issue periodic billing statements to Client on or about the 
first of each month. Client shall pay any and all fees due hereunder within fifteen 
(15) days of the date of each such billing statement. 
As a preliminary finding, the trial denied BushnelPs motion for a directed verdict 
and found that the testimony of Mr. Barker coupled with the invoices constituted 
sufficient evidence to establish the fees charged and services rendered were performed, 
necessary and reasonable. R.435 pg. 318 1. 24-25, pg 319 1. 1-15. After Bushnell 
presented his case, the trial court changed its mind with respect to the "reasonableness" 
of some of the work performed. 
In findings of fact #14 and #15 the trial court found: 
14. Although Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's information was organized in the 
"Quicken program, Barker took it upon itself to prepare a compilation of the 
financial information.. 
15. The Court has reviewed the compilations that were done by Barker, the 
records from which they were produced, and the information contained in the 
"Quicken" program. After considering the evidence, the Court finds that the 
compilation was not reasonable and necessary in order to accomplish the tasks 
required by the contract. ^ 
R.462. 
" The contract is reproduced as Addendum "D" hereto) 
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A review of the Bushnell billings discloses that they do not contain any references 
to the compilations. Accordingly, these "facts" are irrelevant for purposes of determining 
BushnelPs obligation to the Company. The Court made only one finding of fact with 
respect to the Bushnell Billings. This finding found in #36 states "The billing records 
show two categories of billing: one identified as "research, conferences, meetings, and 
correspondences, etc." and a second identified as "compilation and write-up work, etc." 
R.465. Mr. BushnelPs "marshalling of the evidence" consists of three lines of testimony 
found at pg 588 of the transcript of the trial proceedings (R.437). The testimony at issue 
was testimony of Mr. Bushnell simply reading from documents enclosed as Plaintiffs 
Exhibit and the reading actually extended from pg 587 1. 10 through 1. 25 at pg 590. 
Since the so called "marshalling" solely consisted of a reading of Exhibit 4, the 
documents of that exhibit are clearly the relevant information. The evidence presented by 
the Company that support the Company's billings and claim of amount owing consist of 
the Plaintiffs Exhibits 4 and 50 and the testimony Dale K. Barker. Bushnell's evidence 
to the contrary rested on a claim of lack of specificity in the statements contained in 
Exhibit 4 and the testimony of his expert witness Keith Prescott. 
On direct examination, Mr. Prescott testified that he could not tell what was 
included as services for in the billing summaries for Mr. Bushnell beyond what was 
stated in them. He likewise testified that he felt that in a case like Mr. Bushnell's it 
would not be reasonable to charge or to spend 140 hours for research, conferences, 
meetings, and correspondences. R. 436 pgs 416-417. 
12 
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Based on the above, the trial court did not award the Company the amount it 
claimed was owing. The Court found that it could not determine based on the evidence 
presented, that the work that was performed and reasonable was in excess of the amount 
that Bushnell had paid. 
2. The Evidence Does Not Support The Trial Court's Findings. 
While the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", prepared by Bushnell and 
signed by the court, do not give the rationale behind the court's findings, the court did 
provide its reasoning at the hearing where it rendered its findings. 
The Court stated the basis for its finding, that Plaintiff was not entitled to more 
than had been paid, consisted of two factors (1) uwhat I didn't have in terms of evidence -
in terms of the general category meetings and so forth was really many of the particulars. 
There were apparently other records, especially from those that performed tasks other 
than Mr. Barker, but these were not presented here." Transcript of April 21, 2008 Ruling 
pg. 5 (R.452); and (2) "What I'm not able to do, in light of the fact that Mr. Bushnell had 
paid a substantial amount of money, is that work was done that was reasonable, that was 
necessary beyond that which was paid. Though in other words, if Mr. Bushnell had paid 
nothing or a more minimal amounts, I might have been able to conclude from this 
evidence that something more was owed..." Transcript of April 21, 2008 hearing pg.6. 
(R.452). This statement is reflected in paragraphs 44 through 46 of the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. R.466.3 
3
 In his "marshalling", Bushnell does not reference these paragraphs of the conclusions of law, it 
13 
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An examination of the evidence presented at trial shows that these findings are 
incorrect. First, the billing statements contained in Exhibit 4 show that the total paid by 
John Bushnell toward his bill was only slightly over 10% of the total charges. The 
amount paid was not substantial, but was in fact minimal. This is the direct opposite of 
the Court's recollection in its April 21 ruling. 
Furthermore, the Court's recollection that additional detail was not provided on the 
Bushnell billing is inaccurate. While Exhibit 4 did not provide additional detail, there 
was additional detail provided in Exhibit 50. Plaintiffs Exhibit 50 shows more detailed 
entries including a listing of the individual staff members who performed the work and 
what work was performed. Categories of services include computer research, writing 
letters scanning, filing, copying, conferences, preparing drafts, etc. The court's stated 
underpinning for its decision was directly contrary to the evidence as presented at trial. 
The Court did not have to accept the billing evidence and the testimony of Mr. 
Barker to determine the reasonableness of the Company's fees. The Defendants retained 
M. Keith Prescott to give expert testimony in this matter. On cross examination Mr. 
Prescott admitted the rates charged for the work that was performed were reasonable and 
not excessive. Trial Transcript pg 431 (R.436). Mr. Prescott also admitted that the 
charges for preparing the tax returns for Bushnell were not excessive. Trial Transcript pg. 
431 (R.436). 
is presumed however that he is relying on those items set forth in response to paragraph 36. 
14 
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Finding of Fact #22 states "On August 30, 2005 and September 1, 2005, Barker 
prepared Mr. Bushnell's tax returns for the years 1998 through 2003." R.463. On Cross 
Examination Mr. Prescott was asked about the reasonableness of the fees as follows: 
Q. "And isn't it true that you have stated under oath that the fees up to the time the 
tax returns were prepared were not excessive? 
A. Yes it is." Trial Transcript pg. 431 (R.463). 
Mr. Prescott testified that his rate in 2005 was $205 per hour. Trial transcript pg. 
431. Presumptively, Mr. Prescott believes that fee to be reasonable. On cross 
examination Mr. Prescott testified that a reasonable number of hours, just for the 
preparation of the tax returns for Mr. Bushnell would have been 88 hours. Trial 
Transcript pg 435 (R.436). Multiplying Mr. Prescott's "reasonable" rate by the number 
of hours gives a total of $18,040.00 as reasonable compensation for the preparation of the 
tax returns. This does not include the additional charges and fees for dealing with the 
IRS. This amount is actually greater than the amount billed to Bushnell for all services. 
The Court's determination that Bushnell did not breach his contract with the 
Plaintiff was based on the premise that there was a lack of evidence or testimony as to the 
services provided and the reasonableness of those services. Whether you accept the 
testimony of Mr. Barker or the testimony of the Defendants own witness all of the 
evidence presented demonstrates the balance owed by Bushnell was reasonable for the 
work performed. There is no countervailing evidence with respect to Bushnell. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY FOUND A BREACH OF 
CONTRACT ON THE PART OF THE COMPANY. 
15 
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1. The Trial Court Violated the Company's Due Process Rights. 
At the close of evidence, Plaintiff made a motion under Rule 50 for dismissal of 
BushnelPs counterclaim. R. 437 Pg. 663. The counterclaim consisted of two causes of 
action, one for negligence and one for breach of contract. The trial court dismissed the 
claim for negligence, but denied the motion as to the breach of contract claim. R. 437 Pg. 
701. In his breach of contract claim Bushnell had asserted a number of basis for the 
alleged breach. The trial court ruled against all of the alleged breaches except one. The 
trial court identified that the only issue that survived the Rule 50 motion was "whether 
the contract has been breached because Mr. Barker has in an unprofessional manner, 
unnecessary unreasonably did this compilation." Trial transcript pg. 705 (R.437). 
In the findings of fact and conclusions of law, other bases are set forth. These 
include #20 Mr. Barker did not file Mr. BushnelPs tax returns by the date agreed upon 
with the IRS agent, #24 the tax return for 1999 contained an error where it under reported 
income by $45,000.00, #25 the tax return for the year 2004 contained an error where it 
classified Bushnet as a subchapter S corporation, #30 Barker counseled Bushnell not to 
pay the amounts owing until a fee abatement could be requested, and that due to 
nonpayment of the amounts owing federal tax liens were filed for the years 1998, 2000 
and 2003. R.463-464. 
These bases were challenged by the Plaintiff in his Rule 50 motion and dismissed. 
The subsequent inclusion of these items in the findings of fact and conclusion of law are 
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therefore plain error. Plaintiff truncated its rebuttal in this matter based on the Court's 
Rule 50 ruling. To resurrect these items after the dismissal without notice and 
opportunity for rebuttal deprives the Plaintiff of due process by denying it the opportunity 
to adequately rebut these claims. If these basis are stricken only the claim that the 
compilation was unnecessary survives and as demonstrated in Section 2. Below that 
premise is without merit. 
2. Performing The Compilation Does Not Constitute A Breach Of Contract. 
If the trial court had limited itself to the stated only surviving claim, there was no 
breach of contract as a matter of law. Nothing in the contract precludes the Plaintiff from 
providing more services than are needed. First, it should be noted that the determination 
of what is necessary for the rendering of the services, under the contract, is left to the 
discretion of the Company. It is patently inappropriate for the trial court to modify the 
contract by substituting its judgment as to what is necessary. 
It would likewise be inappropriate to substitute the opinion of Mr. Prescott. 
Nowhere in his testimony does he state that his determination that the compilation was 
unnecessary is based on AICPA or other generally accepted standards. To allow any 
competing professional, Prescott's firm took Bushnell on as a client after he left the 
Company, to simply state it would do the job in a different manner would be to open 
every contract up to uncertainty. In this case, for example, one law firm used one 
attorney while the other used two, does that constitute a breach of contract on Bushnelfs 
attorneys part because the case could have been tried in another manner that was less 
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expensive? Clearly, it does not. Unless the work performed is outside of legal or at a 
bare minimum generally accepted standard, it cannot constitute a beach of contract. 
3. The Additional Alleged Breaches Fail To State A Claim As A Matter Of Law. 
If the Court does address the items dismissed in the Rule 50 Motion, they fail to 
state a claim for relief as a matter of law. The first asserted item of breach was a failure 
to file the tax returns by the date agreed to with the IRS agent. Nothing in the contract 
specified the time any of the returns had to be filed with the IRS. Indeed, the returns 
were already past their due dates before Mr. Bushnell approached Mr. Barker for 
representation. Mr. Barker testified that attempts to contact the IRS agent for 
clarification as to how the returns were to be delivered were unsuccessful as the agent 
was out of town. When she was finally reached, the returns were filed in accordance with 
her instructions. There was no evidence presented that the failure to file the returns by 
the August 19, 2005 date impacted Mr. Bushnell in any fashion. 
The second asserted breach was the under reporting of income in the 1999 return. 
Mr. Barker admitted there was an error on this return. The filing of the return with an 
error on it is not however a breach of the contract between the parties. Mr. Bushnell's 
files consisted of over 15,000 pages of documents. While no one desires errors to appear, 
they do happen occasionally. The solution for that problem is to remedy the error. In the 
instant case the error was not found until after Mr. Bushnell had terminated the Plaintiffs 
representation. The remedy for this problem would involve the simple filing of an 
amended return, a one page document. Mr. Bushnell failed to prove this error resulted in 
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a single dollars worth of damages. If this constituted a breach, it was one so minor as to 
not justify the award of in excess of $100,000.00 claimed by the Defendant in this case. 
This would be analogous to a builder failing to complete a punch list item on a house 
construction. The owner is not entitled to void its contract with the builder because of a 
minor error, and then to keep the house. The builder needs only to remedy the error upon 
notice and/or to pay the damage incurred because of the error or omission. In the instant 
case, Bushnell failed to prove any dollar value for his alleged damages resulting in the 
award of nominal damages. 
The third claim is that Bushnet was filed as a subchapter S corporation in error. 
First, it needs to be pointed out that if there were a claim here it would belong to Bushnet, 
not Bushnell. Since Bushnet did not file a counterclaim, the point is moot. Second, the 
testimony was that the decision to file the S corporation return was discussed by Mr. 
Barker and Bushnell prior to its taking place, and the parties agreed to file the return first 
and to subsequently file the S corp. election. In his deposition and trial testimony, 
Prescott admitted that the post filing of the s election was not a big deal. In this case had 
Mr. Barker performed this service it would be one more additional fee that he was not 
getting paid for. 
The final claimed basis of breach was advising Bushnell not to pay the taxes 
owing until such time as the interest and penalties were calculated. Mr. Barker testified 
that he first began discussing with Mr. Bushnell when he should pay his taxes on 
September 1, 2005. Trial transcript pg. 82 (R.434). This was prior to any liens being 
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filed. Mr. Barker testified that Bushnell told him he did not have enough money to pay 
the past taxes and the current taxes as well. Trial transcript pp 83-84 (R.434). At trial 
Mr. Bushnell testified he had enough money to pay the taxes, this is not however what he 
told Mr. Barker. Indeed in his phone conversations with Mr. Barker as transcribed in 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 7, Mr. Bushnell repeatedly stated he didn't have any money to pay his 
bill. See Trial transcript pp 100-101 (R.434). On direct examination Mr. Barker 
summarized one of those conversations: 
Q. So as of January 17, 2006 Mr. Bushnell was telling you he didn't have enough 
money to pay you; is that correct? 
A. Yes. There as underlying, he also owed IRS at that time and he was telling me 
both couldn't get paid. 
Trial transcript pg. 100. 
Even after leaving Mr. Barker for Mr. Prescott's firm Bushnell didn't pay the 
taxes, but instead entered into an installment agreement to pay them over time. All of 
these facts aside, the statement still begs the question of how this alleged deficiency 
breached the contract between the Plaintiff and Bushnell. Plaintiff had no control over 
the IRS. The liens were filed by the IRS based on Bushnell's failure to pay his taxes. 
The IRS problems had arisen after Bushnell failed to file his tax returns. None of these 
were the responsibility of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff made its recommendations to 
Bushnell based on its experience with the IRS and the information provided by Bushnell 
where Bushnell's information was inaccurate or the IRS acted in a way contrary to 
Plaintiffs past experience, there was no breach of any contractual provision by the 
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Plaintiff. 
n. DALE K. BARKER CO. P.C. vs. BUSHNET, INC. 
A. THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION BUSHNET DID 
NOT BREACH ITS CONTRACT WITH THE PLAINTIFF. 
1. Marshalling Of The Evidence. 
The contract terms between the Company and Bushnet were identical to those 
entered into between the Company and Bushnell as set forth in Section I A.l.b. above. 
The contract was entered as Plaintiffs Exhibit # 3 at trial. The billing summaries for 
Bushnet were admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit #5. Unlike Bushnell however, there were no 
additional detailed statements entered as an Exhibit.4 
In its findings of fact, the trial court made the following relevant findings: 
14. Although Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet's information was organized in the "Quicken" 
program, Barker took it upon itself to prepare a compilation of the financial information. 
15. The Court has reviewed the compilations that were done by Barker, the records from 
which they were produced, and the information contained in the "Quicken" program. 
After considering the evidence the Court finds that the compilation was not reasonable 
and necessary in order to accomplish the tasks required by the contract. 
35. At the time Mr. Bushnell terminated his relationship with Barker, Barker had billed 
Mr. Bushnell and Bushnet a total of $64,300.21. 
36. The billing records show two categories of billing one identified as "research, 
conferences, meetings, and correspondences, etc," and a second identified as 
"compilation and write-up work, etc." 
37. Mr. Bushnell paid $32,500 to Barker. 
In his marshalling of the evidence, for support of #14, Bushnell cites to Mr. 
4
 The additional statements were offered but were not admitted upon BushnelPs objection. 
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Barker's trial testimony where he states the need for a compilation due to the potential 
criminal aspects of BushnelPs willful failure to file his tax returns and pay his taxes. R. 
434 pg 62 L 10-25. It is an undisputed fact that the decision to prepare the compilation 
was made by Mr. Barker after discussing the need with Bushnell. 
In his marshalling of evidence to support #15, Bushnell does not cite to any part of 
the record. He does however refer to the "totality of evidence contained in the Quicken 
Program disks, and the compilation of data prepared by Mr. Barker". The actual 
supporting evidence is better demonstrated through the testimony of Keith Prescott. 
On direct examination, Mr. Prescott was asked if he had reviewed the billing 
summaries contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit 5. Mr. Prescott indicated that he had. He was 
then asked if he could discern what work was contained within those general descriptions 
and he testified he could not. R. 436 pg 414-415. 
Mr. Prescott went on to testify that the total number of hours that would have had 
to be billed to Bushnet for the research, conferences, meetings and correspondence would 
have been between 120 and 140 hours and that it would not have been reasonable to have 
charged that many hours for that type of activity. R.436 pg. 415-416. 
With respect to the compilation reports Mr. Prescott was asked directly whether in 
his opinion preparation of the compilation reports was necessary. He answered directly, 
no. R. 436 pg. 404. 
Finally, upon direct examination, Mr. Prescott answered a number of questions 
relating the figures shown as income on the Quicken disk to those found in the 
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compilations and those finally presented on the tax returns. While all of the figures were 
different, on some occasions, the figures used on the tax return were closer to the 
numbers on the Quicken disk than on the compilation. 
The Statements and bills for Bushnet, P.C. were contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit 
#5. The Statement shows total invoices of $45,355.20 and corresponding payments of 
$30,320.00. This is a little misleading however, as $12, 680.20 was simply 
reimbursement for the taxes owed by Bushnell paid by Dale K. Barker Co. P.C. on behalf 
of Bushnell. The actual fees for services were therefore $32,675.00 and actual payments 
against that amount were $17,639.80. 
The evidence with respect to the remaining "findings of fact" are not in dispute 
between the parties. 
BushnelPs argument comes down to the fact that the summary billing statements 
do not contain sufficient detail to allow for a determination that the charges listed therein 
were incurred reasonably or that they are reasonable in amount. It is undisputed that the 
billing categories are general in nature. 
Therefore, if, as a matter of law, the bills must contain more detailed descriptions 
and amounts, the bills are insufficient. To the extent, the bills are more specific in nature, 
detailing the compiling of the source documents and information, Mr. Prescott testified 
that in his personal opinion such a compilation was unnecessary. 
2. The evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding. 
On cross examination Mr. Prescott stated he had not rendered an opinion in his 
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expert report relating to the reasonableness of the hours spent on the Bushnet returns. 
R.436 pg. 435. He did opine however that he believed the compilation of the Bushnet 
records was unnecessary as part of the return preparation. R.436 pg 436. Mr. Prescott 
testified that the preparation of a compilation in connection with a tax return did not 
violate any AICPA rule respecting how a tax return was supposed to be prepared. R.436 
pg436. 
Mr. Prescott5 s opinion that the compilation was not necessary, was simply his 
personal opinion, not one founded in any generally accepted rule of any organized body 
governing tax practice or certified public accountants. His personal opinion as to the lack 
of necessity of the compilation required an acceptance that the Quicken files provided by 
Denise Naylor were sufficient in accuracy and detail to obviate the need of independent 
verification which was obtained through the compilation process. Indeed in its analysis 
the Court stated: 
...in terms of whether the task was necessary given Mr. Barker's obligations 
and his legal and ethical obligations, if you will, and the standards in the 
industry, a compilation may be called for if he perceived that this 
compilation was not correct, was questionable, was not complete, had not 
considered all that needed to be considered, and all the categories 
considered, and all that had to be considered in requiring him to work with 
that compilation with that - with those records around. None of that was 
presented, and none of that was even really suggested. 
R.452 Hearing Transcript April 21, 2005 pg. 7 1. 14-21. 
The trial court's recollection of the evidence presented at trial was in error. In his 
trial testimony Mr. Barker indicated that in his first meeting with Mr. Bushnell and 
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Denise Naylor he informed them that part of the work that he would be performing 
involved a compilation of all the Bushnet items. R. 434. Trial Transcript pg. 62, 127. Mr. 
Barker also testified that the information on the Quicken disk was not in a form that 
could be used with reliability to prepare the tax returns. R.434. Trial Transcript pg. 128, 
129, 141. Mr. Barker testified specifically as to the data on the quicken disk as follows: 
Q. Did you create source documents to lead back to the preparation of the tax 
returns? 
A. Yes, and they were not released but they were in the documentation. 
Q. Did they differ significantly from the Quicken disk income balance sheet? 
A. Yes, they did. 
Even without Mr. Barker's testimony, significant discrepancies in the Quicken 
data are evident. The Court identified income differences, but even more glaring are 
differences in claimed expenses. In the Company's Memorandum in Support of its Rule 
59 motion the evidence is placed in a summary form. The Quicken figures presented at 
trial are shown on the spreadsheet attached thereto as Exhibit "C". R. 525. The actual tax 
return entries are attached in spreadsheet form attached thereto as Exhibit "D". R. 527. 
Finally, a comparison of the two sets of numbers is attached thereto as Exhibit "E". R. 
529. The differences in the expense postings were $60,870.34 for 1997, $73,900.40 for 
1998, $44,388.43 in 1999, $70, 623.72 in 2000, $35,825.72 in 2001, $39,367.13 in 2002, 
$70,765.29 in 2003 and $172,730.15 in 2004. The significance of these discrepancies is 
readily apparent, just as it was readily apparent to Mr. Barker that he could not rely solely 
on the Quicken disk for the figures to be included on the tax return, but that he needed to 
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gather the relevant source documents to compare with the Quicken figures to derive the 
correct and accurate information for the tax returns. 
The bulk of the "compilation" time is set forth and identified on the Bushnet 
statement and bills. Examining the Court's ruling in light of the evidence presented 
demonstrates that not only should Mr. Barker have compiled the information necessary 
for the returns outside of the quicken files, but that he was compelled to do so due to their 
inaccuracies, misclassifications and errors. 
Mr. Prescott did not give any opinion on the Bushnet fees in his pretrial report. 
His opinion that he could simply use the quicken disk to prepare the Bushnet information 
is clearly based on incomplete or inaccurate information as demonstrated by the data 
presented to the court. 
III. ISSUES AFFECTING BOTH CLAIMS 
A. THE TRIAL COURT'S REQUIREMENT OF DETAILED BILLINGS WAS 
INCORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
1. The Scope Of The Work. 
In finding of fact #10 the trial court found: 
Because there is no definite understanding as to what work must be done, 
and taking into consideration that the contract was drafted by Barker and 
was not negotiated at arm's length, the Court applies a reasonable and 
necessary standard to determine whether the work done by Barker was 
required under the contract. 
R.461. 
In his "marshalling" of the evidence, Bushnell states this "Finding of Fact is a 
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conclusion of law supported by multifarious bits of evidence."R.564. Initially it should 
be noted that Bushnell recognizes this is not correctly designated as a fact, but should 
instead be a conclusion of law. Secondly, it should be noted that the conclusion itself is 
in error. 
First, there is no dispute as to what the scope of the work was to be. It involved 
the review of the 1995 and 1996 tax returns, filed by Bushnell, to determine if the 
assessments made by the IRS for those years was correct. It then involved preparation of 
the 1997 through 2004 tax returns for Bushnell and the 2004 tax return for Bushnet. 
Finally it called for negotiations with the IRS by Mr. Barker on BushnelPs behalf. 
The written contract specified the work to be performed was : 
1. Scope of Services. Barker agrees to perform the following services for Client, 
including such additional services related thereto which are reasonably required. 
(a.) All requested services as set forth by Client and as understood by Barker either 
express, written, or/and implied. Also, the acceptance of all prior services and billings 
rendered by Barker. 
The services listed above are the services requested by Bushnell. These were the 
services provided. A more accurate rendering of the statement of fact would have been 
that the written contract does not specify how the requested services would be performed. 
This however is true of most contracts. If someone goes to a mechanic to have a problem 
with their car repaired, the contract does not specify how the mechanic goes about the 
repair it simply authorizes that the repair be made. If someone contracts with an attorney 
to handle litigation, the contract does not specify what every step of the litigation will be 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
comprised of, it simply authorizes the attorney to take the steps he or she deems 
necessary to best represent the client. There was absolutely no evidence that a standard 
contract between a certified public accountant and its clients provide any more detailed 
description of services than the contract at issue here. 
2. The Contract Was An Arm's Length Agreement 
Finding of Fact # 10 goes on to say that the contract was not negotiated at arm's 
length. R.461. There is no factual or legal support for this conclusion. In R&R Energies 
v. Mother Earth Industries, 936 P.2d 1068, 1077 (Utah 1997) the Utah Supreme Court 
defined an arm's length contract as one between two unrelated parties. Black's Law 
Dictionary defines an arm's length contract as "Of or relating to dealings between two 
parties who are not related or not on close terms and who are presumed to have roughly 
equal bargaining power;..." Black's Law Dictionary 7th Edition pg. 103 (1999). 
Prior to the entry of this contract, there was absolutely no relationship between the 
Company and Bushnell. The Company is just one of hundreds of CPAs in the Salt Lake 
Metropolitan area. Nothing required Bushnell to hire the Company as opposed to any 
other CPA. "It is still the law in Utah that parties may contract at arm's length without the 
intervention of the courts to rescue one side or the other from the result of that bargain." 
Woodhaven Apartments v. Washington, 942 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah 1997). 
Bushnell and Bushnet entered into arm's length contracts with the Company for 
the provision of services. The Company sent monthly statements setting forth the 
charges for those services. There were no objections made to those charges until long 
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after the Company's services were terminated. Even if Bushnell made a bad bargain, 
which the Company denies, the laws of the State of Utah preclude the action of the trial 
court here which stepped in and essentially reformed the contract depriving the Company 
of its bargained for compensation. 
B. THE COMPANY NEEDED TO COMPILE THE INFORMATION, 
On direct examination, Mr. Prescott, Bushnell's hired "expert" testified as to the 
standards required of a tax preparer. He testified as follows: 
A. The standard is that I can't accept, I can't accept what the client brings to me without 
verification. 
R. 435 pg. 358 1.14-15. 
The trial court itself recognized the Company's duty it stated: 
...in terms of whether the task was necessary given Mr. Barker's obligations and 
his legal and ethical obligations, if you will, and the standards in the industry, a 
compilation may be called for if he perceived that this compilation was not correct, 
was questionable, was not complete, had not considered all that needed to be 
considered, and all the categories considered, and all that had to be considered in 
requiring him to work with that compilation with that - with those records around. 
None of that was presented, and none of that was even really suggested. 
R. 452 Hearing Transcript April 21, 2005 pg. 7 114-22. 
The Defendants introduced an Exhibit which they claim consisted of the 
"Quicken" data given to Mr. Barker. The Expenses shown on that exhibit differ by tens 
of thousands of dollars from those determined to actually be the expenses and which were 
used on the tax return. 
While Mr. Prescott may have been willing to use those incorrect figures on the tax 
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return, his own testimony as to what the standards require, make such an approach an 
inescapable violation of the standards of the AICPA. 
It needs to further be noted that there was no testimony that preparation of the 
compilation was not in accordance with AICPA standards. Indeed even Mr. Prescott's 
testimony was directly to the contrary. 
On direct examination, the following evidence was adduced: 
Q. Mr. Prescott, I'm handing you what has been marked as Exhibit 48, D-48. Do 
you recognize this document? 
A. I do. 
Q. And do you know what this document is? 
A. It's the AICPA standards, Statement on Standards for Tax Services. 
Q. And what's the purpose of this document? 
A. To give us guidance I think they say in the preamble to give us guidance above 
what Circular 230 gives us in setting standards for practice. 
Q. Would you please turn to Page 21? 
A. Sure. 
Q. And what is the purpose of this section? 
A. It sets forth the applicable standards for members concerning the obligation to 
examine and verify certain supporting data. I'm reading it, "or to consider 
information related to another taxpayer when preparing a tax return." 
Q. Okay, and in here does it give any guidance at to when you may rely upon the 
representations of a client? 
A. Yes, in Paragraph 2, it talks about "In preparing and signing a return a member 
may, in good faith, rely without verification on information furnished by the 
taxpayer or by third parties. However, a member should not ignore the 
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implications of information furnished and should make reasonable inquiries if the 
information furnished appears to be incorrect, incomplete or inconsistent. 
R.436 pp. 397-398. 
According to the AICPA standards, quoted by Mr. Prescott, if the information 
presented by the client was incomplete, incorrect or inconsistent the preparer is required 
to make further inquiry to verify the data. The "Quicken" data provided to the Company 
by Naylor at BushnelPs request, suffered from all three deficiencies. 
The trial court's finding that there was no such evidence, ignores the direct 
testimony of Mr. Barker and even more telling the written evidence introduced by 
Bushnell consisting of what he portrayed as the "Quicken" data and the tax returns as 
actually filed. This physical evidence showed tens of thousands of dollar discrepancies in 
expenses every single year. 
Even, if the standards did not require a more detailed examination, there is 
• certainly nothing in the standards stating that a compilation is not necessary. Neither was 
there any testimony or evidence at trial that compiling the information was not in 
accordance with community standards. On cross examination, BushnelPs expert Mr. 
Prescott testified: 
Q. Now does every tax preparer go about preparing tax returns in the same way? 
A. No. 
Q. And is there anything in the preparation of a compilation that violates any 
AICPA tax rule with respect to how a tax return is supposed to be prepared under 
the AICPA guidelines? 
A. Is there anything with respect to the preparation of a compilation a violation? 
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Q. Yes that violates the rules as to how a tax return is supposed to be prepared 
under the AICPA guidelines. 
A. No. 
R. 436 1.6-16. 
The contract entered between Bushnell and Bushnet and the Company provided 
that the work as defined by the parties was to be performed by the Company in the way it 
deemed appropriate. The Company deemed a compilation of data was needed because 
the information given by the taxpayers was incomplete and inaccurate. The Defendant's 
own witness admitted that the compilation was not a violation of any applicable standard. 
His bought and paid for opinion, delivered in retrospect, was simply that he would have 
done it differently. This is not enough to justify the trial court in essence reforming the 
contract and denying the Company it's bargained for compensation. 
C. BUSHNELL AND BUSHNET ACCEPTED THE CHARGES AS MADE. 
Plaintiff introduced as Exhibits 66 through 74 a series of letters which were 
prepared by the Company and signed by Bushnell. The letters were dated between 
August 31, 2005 and September 15, 2005. Each of the letters refers specifically to an 
individual tax year. Each letter states that Bushnell accepts the work performed to that 
date and acknowledges receipt of the billing for that work. Each statement likewise 
acknowledges Bushnell's responsibility for those payments. The trial court simply chose 
to disregard these agreements. This was clearly inappropriate. 
The Company relied upon Bushnell's agreement to pay for the services he had received, 
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in its agreement to continue to provide additional services. The trial court's disregarding 
of the promise to pay by Bushnell in effect sanctions a fraud. It allows Bushnell to have 
obtained additional services on the representation they would be paid for, when 
apparently there was no such intention. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT OVER ASSESSED THE COSTS AND FEES 
AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANTS. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF FEES WAS EXCESSIVE. 
In the Amended Declaration of Brennan H. Moss in support of 
defendants/counter-claimants application for attorney fees and expert witness fees Mr. 
Moss states on page 2 paragraph 3 "that the amount attorney fees in this case includes 
work conducted from the answering of plaintiffs complaint through trial". R. 291.5 That 
representation was not true. A review of the detailed billing statements contained within 
Mr. Moss#s declaration shows that they included 
requests for attorney fees from April 11 through June 13, 2006, all of these fees were 
allegedly incurred prior to the filing of the complaint. 
The express provision of the service agreement under which, defendants are 
claiming entitlement to fees states "in the event of a breach of this agreement, the non-
defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs and attorney fees incurred in enforcing this 
agreement or in seeking any other remedy". Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 #8. Since no action had 
5
 After the close of briefing Mr. Moss filed yet a third memorandum of costs and fees where he 
extended the period purportedly covered to include pre trial work, this however should not have 
been recoverable as it was outside of the period for which the Plaintiff could have recovered its 
fees under the contract. It should be disregarded as it was improperly submitted after the close of 
briefing, without leave of the court. 
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been brought by either party with respect to "enforcing the agreement" prior to filing of 
the complaint any pre-complaint fees would not have been awardable. This clearly was 
recognized by Mr. Moss when he claimed that they had not been sought in his 
declaration. 2 Mr. Moss#s declaration also includes substantial billings for matters "post 
trial". 
In addition, this litigation involved one other party and associated causes of action. 
This was comprised of the third-party complaint filed against Mr. Barker personally 
which Mr. Bushnell lost. Mr. Bushnell was required to separate out those fees relating to 
causes of action where he did not prevail from those in which he did. He has failed to do 
so. Utah Courts have found that a failure to separate out such costs can be reason enough 
for denial of attorney fees. Mountain States Broad Co. vs. Neele, 783 P. 2d 551, 556 
(Utah App. 1989). A review of Mr. Moss#s declaration clearly discloses the request for 
some fees that related solely to the third-party complaint and there are other entries that 
appear to be blends of clearly inappropriate fees with other fees. It was the duty of the 
defendant to separate those fees, not the duty of the plaintiff to have to hunt and peck 
through the voluminous general entries made by the plaintiff in an attempt to decide what 
fees were being charged. 
Notwithstanding this lack of a duty, the Company in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Request for Attorneys Fees and Costs, showed that the 
Defendants asked for, and received, $1,048.50 for pre complaint services. R.341. The 
Company also showed that Bushnell had requested, and was ultimately awarded, at least 
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$2,803.50 in fees for services relating solely to the Third Party Complaint which was 
against Mr. Barker personally and which Bushnell lost. R. 343. 
In addition, Bushnell elected to have two counsel present for virtually all 
depositions, for the entire trial of this matter, and for post trial meetings and hearings. 
While taken individually the billing rate of individual attorneys are probably within the 
reasonable range of attorneys in this market, the combined rate is excessive, and that is 
the rate that in essence the court awarded. It would accordingly be appropriate for this 
Court to limit the amount of the Attorneys fees and reduce then on the basis of 
duplicative time spent on this matter. A classic example of this problem is demonstrated 
in the time spent on the deposition of Dale K. Barker in this matter. The declaration of 
Brennan H. Moss demonstrates the time purportedly spent in preparing for that 
deposition was approximately 56.75 hours. The fees that were charged for the preparation 
and attendance are in excess of $10,000. The actual time of the deposition, included in 
those figures, was 7.81 hours.6 
The amount of time spent in relation to the relative lack of complexity involved in 
this matter would justify this courts adjustment of the attorneys fees. Support for this 
type of determination on the part of the Court can be found in the recent Utah Court of 
Appeals decision Stonecreek Landscaping vs. Bell 2008 UT APP 144 (Utah App. 
04/24/2008). R.347-352 There the Court of Appeals upheld the trial courts 
determination to reduce the amount of fees claimed by a Mechanic Lien claimant whom 
6
 A listing of all the fees relating to the deposition as contained in Moss's declaration is set forth at R.345. 
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it determined was the prevailing party, based on factors including the fact that the 
plaintiff did not prevail on all of the issues which it was litigating. In this case the trial 
court ruled against defendant on his two causes of action in his third-party complaint and 
against all of one cause of action and most of the other in the counter-claim. It would be 
appropriate to reduce fees accordingly. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS WAS EXCESSIVE. 
Bushnell originally requested costs including expert witness fees in the amount of 
$17,450.65. He then claimed that amount was in error and requested expert witness fees 
in the amount of $25,188.45. The trial court ended up awarding total costs of $32,013.20. 
"Costs were not recoverable at common law; and are therefore generally allowable only in 
the amounts and in the manner provided by statute". Frampton vs. Wilson, 605 P. 2d 771, 
773 (1980). "The Utah Supreme Court has defined costs to mean those fees which are 
required to be paid to the court and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be 
included in the judgment." Morgan vs. Morgan, 795 P. 2d, 684, 686 (Utah App. 1990)." 
There is a distinction to be understood between legitimate and taxable costs and other 
expenses of litigation which may be ever so necessary, but are not properly taxable as 
costs." Frarnpton at 774. 
In the declaration of Mr. Moss, he sought a recovery for the following "expert 
witnesses" Steve Smith, Keith Prescott, Val Oveson, and staff of these individuals. Only 
Mr. Prescott appeared at deposition and/or appeared at trial in this matter. Of these 
individuals only Mr. Prescott was identified as an expert witness pursuant to the 
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scheduling order and the pretrial disclosures of Rule 26. 6 Since these other individuals 
were not designated, were not deposed, and did not participate directly in the litigation as 
witnesses, it was inappropriate for them to be paid by the plaintiff as expert witnesses in 
this case. The court should disallow the so called expert fees for any individuals or 
entities other than Mr. Prescott. 
At trial, the Company was pilloried for its lack of detail in its billing records, and 
in fact was denied recovery at least in part on the basis of lack of detailed information. 
Examinations of the so called "accurate itemization of time spent and billed for expert 
witnesses" shows even a more casual attitude towards providing detail billing 
information. 
It is interesting to begin with to look at the first three entries under page 39 
paragraph 25. R.423-424. The first two entries clearly regard a subpoena that was issued 
to the firm of Wisan, Prescott, and Smith as part of the discovery process. The subpoena 
had nothing do with expert testimony or preparation of expert testimony. Wisan and 
Smith was the accounting firm that took over the representation of Mr. Bushnell and 
allegedly completed some of the work that Mr. Bushnell wanted performed. Clearly, it 
would be inappropriate to award any "expert witness fees" for the time spent by third-
parties to comply with discovery requests. The fourth entry simply says "litigation 
support" and solely designates the person or individual purportedly providing this service 
as staff. So not only do we not have identification of the individual actually performing 
the services, but we have no idea what the supposed litigation support consists of. The 
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next entry which is 5 hours on behalf of Mr. Smith (a potential fact witness, but never a 
designated expert witness) is again the response to the initial subpoena which has nothing 
to do with any expert testimony. 
On page 41, the unidentified staffs total summation of their work is "work on 
Dale Barkers case". According to July 19 and July 20 entries, Mr. Prescott was 
preparing his expert report. Mr. Prescott testified this was his report and he prepared it. 
These representations are interesting when you consider the entries of the attorneys fees 
record showing that it was the attorneys office that actually prepared the initial report. 
On pages 24 and 25 it shows attorneys worked and prepared that report between July 16, 
and 23. R.408-409. When we come to the entries towards the end of the expert witness 
summary they get even more vague. Instead of setting out the date that services were 
provided Prescott, Oveson and Smith simply put down a volume of hours which 
purportedly were spent in the month, Prescott#s entry of March 08 is simply "Prepare for 
trial and provide expert witness services." For that, he billed 34.75 hours over $8,000, 
Oveson#s request is even worse for the month of March he claimed he spent 8.50 hours at 
$1,700 preparing to provide expert testimony. 
In summary, many of the costs awarded are for individuals who were not 
designated experts for this case. The fees awarded for expert witnesses include general 
categories with insufficient detail to identify what, when, where, or who the work was 
performed by. They also include charges and fees for items that are completely unrelated 
to any potential expert witness testimony and in fact relate to responding to a properly 
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served subpoena. It would be appropriate therefore for the court to disregard any request 
for fees or at bare minimum to eliminate all but those easily discernable charges for Mr. 
Prescott that otherwise are appropriately taxable. 
CONCLUSION 
After the close of evidence the trial court did not address this case for an extended 
period of time. The result of this delay appears to have been a lack of recollection as to 
what evidence was actually presented at trial. An examination of that evidence shows it to 
be directly contrary to the court's ruling. 
The trial court's ruling also fails for the reason that it is based on an incorrect 
legal standard. The trial court improperly substituted its belief as to what constituted 
"reasonable and necessary services" in place of the Company's determination and the 
client's acceptance. The correct legal standard required acceptance of the terms of the 
contract between the parties. 
Finally, the court erred in awarding excessive costs and fees. These items are not 
properly allowable or charged to the Company and should be stricken. 
The Company therefore respectfully requests that the judgments entered against it 
in this matter be vacated, that it be awarded its damages as prayed for in the complaint and 
that this matter is remanded for an award of fees and costs to the Company. 
DATED this 19th day of February, 2009 
LARSON, TURNER, DALBY & ETHINGTON 
Shawn D. Turner 
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